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This paper addresses future perspectives for the management of resources on an international 
level. Failures of international open markets result in significant material leakage. Here, taking 
the example of material used vehicles, we develop elements of an international metal covenant 
that should allow for a more sustainable management of global material flows in that area. Our 
proposal is based on two principles: any regulation should actively seek industry participation, 
taking advantage of business interest in supplying a sufficient quantity of materials while lower-
ing materials costs; and it should also address public issues such as sustainability of recycling 
and waste. In this paper we first analyse contracts as a tool for bridging gaps in knowledge when 
multiple actors are involved. We then give empirical evidence for material leakage in the case of 
used vehicles from Germany, before outlining the elements of a proposed international metals 
covenant. Finally, we analyse potential impacts and discuss legal and institutional issues. 
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2. CooperaTion agreemenTs  
To solve Knowledge problems
The starting point for our considerations is the hypothesis 
that the lack of complete global material cycles for materi-
als contained in end-of-life products is caused by knowledge 
problems and transaction costs. On the one hand, recycling 
markets have failed to work properly because an asymmetri-
cal distribution of information between recyclers and indus-
try purchasing secondary raw materials has been impairing 
 eficient agreements. On the other, the governments are lack-
ing suficient information that would be needed to correct the 
existing market failure in an optimal way by direct regulation. 
Neither governments nor enterprises have the knowledge 
required to initiate and implement long-term changes to-
wards sustainability. Rather, it is necessary to develop joint 
mechanisms, taking into account strategic interests and op-
tions for action (Bleischwitz, 2004; de Bruijn & Tukker, 2002; 
Grin et al., 2010). “Industrial transformation goes beyond the 
notion of eco-eficiency and beyond the domain of individual 
actors. It is about system innovation, both technological and 
institutional,” (de Bruijn & Tukker, 2002, p.8). Regarding the 
problems considered in the present publication, we will focus 
on innovations that reduce material intensity. The concept of 
“responsible corporate governance” aims at a concentration 
of potential self-interests of industry and their merging by 
means of suitable incentives (Bleischwitz, 2007).
The development of cooperative approaches to material low 
innovations may also be substantiated from the waste man-
agement perspective. In this context, considerations are based 
on the fact that so far, recycling rates for certain substances 
contained in end-of-life vehicles (ELVs) have been too low 
because potential recycling activities that would have been 
proitable both from the ecological and economic perspective 
were overlooked. Reasons for this include the costs to enter-
prises associated with obtaining the required information on 
quality features of recycled products and materials that would 
allow them to conclude contracts recognized as favourable 
for all parties involved. In contrast, the European ELV Direc-
tive (Directive 2000/53/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 18 September 2000 on ELVs) has encouraged 
cherry-picking by single actors in recovery processes preced-
ing the waste management stage — for example, only taking 
out valuable components like radios. Such practice has been 
aggravating a shift of the environmental problem due to the 
export of used cars into countries without suficient waste 
infrastructures. As a consequence, overcoming knowledge 
deicits becomes an independent regulatory objective–not as 
a suficient, but a necessary precondition in order to improve 
the market eficiency.
In the context of imbalances of information, the operational 
rationality of maintaining established design and produc-
tion processes should be pointed out. This is attractive for 
1. inTrodUCTion
For decades growth in wealth and wellbeing has been 
based on the increasing and unsustainable use of resourc-
es ( Bringezu & Bleischwitz, 2009; European Commission, 
2011). Facing scarcities of supply along with sustainability 
challenges, much more eficient methods of turning waste 
into secondary resources are required. In particular, such 
methods should avoid the common “downcycling” of materi-
als, in which the quality of the material is reduced with each 
cycle. For a long time, such concepts of keeping  materials 
in closed circuits have been seen in a local and national 
context only: historically, waste policy has been consid-
ered a responsibility of local governments or councils. Ac-
cordingly the regulative framework that has emerged aims 
at preventing environmental burdens on-site (Kranert & 
 Cord-Landwehr, 2010). 
The creation of global material cycles should be consid-
ered as a new challenge to the paradigm of a “recycling 
society”–a concept lagged by the European Commis-
sion and others ( European Commission, 2005; Fischer & 
 Davidsen, 2010). A fresh look at metals and their role in 
any such recycling societies seems necessary for two rea-
sons. First, it is dificult to imagine that metals could be 
replaced by renewable raw materials produced locally on 
a sustainable basis. Thus, countries poor in raw materi-
als resources (such as Germany) will have to deal with a 
sustainable use of metals. Secondly, international markets 
for used products are a reality, so that domestic recycling 
will encounter considerable obstacles. Increasing demand 
for resources and low recycling rates for metals (UNEP 
2011) require an international perspective. The present 
article will address this issue, taking the subject of used 
vehicles as an example. Internationally scattered markets 
are characterized by insuficient recycling capacities and 
techniques in some regions. As a consequence, consider-
able material losses and negative environmental impacts 
have become evident.
This is a primary reason why a better international manage-
ment of metal markets is at stake (Crowson, 2011; Hagelüken, 
2011). The authors’ considerations start with a number of 
knowledge problems. As a rule, the buyer of a used product 
does not know which materials are contained in the product. 
At the same time, it may be assumed that the material losses 
observed today are to be attributed to a lack of management 
and that the development of appropriate mechanisms could 
well mobilize actors who are interested in the completion of 
material cycles. Such steering function could be assumed by 
an international metal “covenant” as a speciic voluntary, but 
binding form of environmental agreement (Bressers, 2003), 
which could prove the basis for a cooperation of industry and 
governments. It has been the authors’ intent to develop basic 
elements of such an agreement and to discuss critical aspects 
as well as possible consequences. 
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1 i.e. new member states from Central and Eastern Europe.
tons to 14 million tons in 2015 (EEA, 2008). ELVs contain a great 
number of materials. Among these are material fractions in-
cluding rare metals, which already today may be recovered in 
a proitable way, but also toxic substances posing considerable 
risks to humans and the environment. Thus, the link between 
material eficiency and resource conservation becomes insepa-
rable: it is proitable for individual enterprises, and it is required 
from the environmental angle. If the promotion of metal recy-
cling included only those options that are proitable for enter-
prises, the problem of negative environmental impacts due to 
harmful substances and disposal would remain unresolved on 
an international level. It follows that a covenant in this ield will 
have to deal with both, concentrating the interests of the indus-
tries involved and taking care of public matters. At the same 
time, deicits in product policy become evident: such policy is 
too wide-meshed for the special cases of individual metals, and 
it has to comply with the principle of territoriality, which is dei-
cient in the presence of internationally open markets. 
In Germany, only a small share of de-registered vehicles is 
 recovered inside the country. This is why innovative instruments 
should primarily aim at recycling standards in the countries of 
destination (see Lucas & Wilts, 2009). In 2008, no more than 
about 15% of the 3 million deinitively de-registered vehicles 
were recovered in Germany (see Figure 1). Vehicles exported 
from Germany to EU-10 countries1 are often purchased for re-
use by third parties in non-EU countries. In 2008, Kazakhstan 
represented the most important country of  destination quanti-
tatively for used car exports from the EU. 
 enterprises because it allows them to maintain existing pro-
duction facilities and processes as well as supplier relation-
ships. To summarize, the consequences of imbalances in 
 information have systemic dimensions in several respects:
• Under the prevailing conditions, high follow-up costs in 
the form of environmental damage, social costs and mar-
ket distortion are generated on an international level.
• International follow-up costs result in distortions on 
the domestic market for material eficiency and re-
source conservation.
• The potential for future innovative paths of recovery 
and sustainable resource management is impaired.
Hence, the quest for better governance required against this 
background should aim to: 
• abolish the present sharing of knowledge about interna-
tional material lows along the product utilization chain 
involving industrial stakeholders in the ields of automo-
biles, metal and recycling; and
• develop knowledge on sustainability potentials.
3. Used Car eXporTs and maTerial 
losses as a problem field
Vehicle recycling harbours a considerable potential for  material 
eficiency and resource conservation. The volume of ELVs gen-
erated within the EU will increase from the current 10 million 
Figure 1. Fate of vehicles deinitively de-registered in Germany in 2008 
Source: UBA & BMU 2011
Exports not covered by
statistics, theft, usage
on private land
 Foreign trade statistics
- Former Soviet Union   113,000
 - West Africa 60,000
 Used cars:
 Re-registration in EU
- Poland 702,000
- Romania 209,000
- Czech Republic 172,000
ELVs
0.42 million
Other
0.85 million
Exports to
non-EU
0.24 million
Exports to
EU States
1.5 million
3.0 million cars
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For EU member states, it may be assumed that due to the 
 implementation of the ELV Directive, high-quality recycling 
technologies will be used at least in the medium term. How-
ever, a major share of used cars will directly, or after another 
utilization phase in the EU-10 countries, end up in  countries 
not committed to the ambitious recycling targets of the 
 European ELV Directive. Even in large cities such as Moscow, a 
mere 10,000 out of 130,000 de-registered vehicles were recy-
cled in 2009 (Lucas & Wilts, 2011). At the same time, there has 
been a variety of illegal or tolerated practices to “dispose of” 
motor-vehicle bodies and parts in backyards, on roadsides, on 
secluded sites, or illegal dumps. 
These lacking or insuficient international recycling infrastruc-
tures result in irretrievable losses of raw materials. Hence, 
there are systematic deicits in recording export lows of used 
vehicles and indications of probable law infringements. The 
resulting responsibility loopholes lead to considerable inter-
ruptions in the cause-effect chain: the ambitious objectives 
of the ELV Directive, viz. to achieve product design enhance-
ments and ensure environmentally sound recovery after use 
on the basis of producer responsibility, are undermined by 
insuficient control of vehicle lows and enforcement deicits 
(SRU, 2008, p.732). Presently, the objectives and  obligations 
of product responsibility stop at the borders of the EU mem-
ber states. Consequently, the aims should be that (a) export 
is no longer used as a cost-effective option to evade producer 
responsibility and (b), potentials for material eficiency and 
resource conservation may be opened up also on an interna-
tional level. Therefore, enhanced incentives should be created 
for shifting producer responsibility towards material respon-
sibility. This need for innovative instruments can be linked to 
the general discussion about critical metals like rare earths–
the EU wants to develop new approaches to mobilize end-of-
life products and develop international networks in order to 
secure the supply of these metals for the European industry.
4. a proposal for a fUTUre  
inTernaTional meTals CovenanT 
In the following, based on the deicits observed and the limits 
of direct regulation regarding the recycling of exported vehi-
cles, a covenant is outlined that has the objective of enhanc-
ing material eficiency and resource conservation in this ield 
of action. Covenants represent a combination of elements of 
direct governmental regulation and self-regulation by indus-
try in speciic countries relevant for the export and import 
of ELVs. In principle, covenants may be characterized by the 
 following elements:
• industrial sectors commit themselves to achieving long-
term goals;
• these goals are negotiated in cooperation with the re-
sponsible authorities in the public sector;
• in return, the public authorities commit themselves 
to creating appropriate framework conditions and to 
 omitting further direct regulatory measures for the 
 contract period;
• covenants are concluded as private law contracts be-
tween all parties involved. Such contracts include both 
sanction mechanisms in case the stipulated goals are 
not achieved, and options to adapt the terms and condi-
tions in case of changing framework conditions.
The covenant’s goal (to be agreed upon) should be to contrib-
ute to the completion of material cycles in the ield of exported 
used cars. Depending on the type of material, such material 
cycles should be established on different spatial levels. While 
recycling standards are deined for steel car bodies in the 
countries of destination, enhanced recording and monitoring 
will provide for the return of certain resource-intensive frac-
tions such as copper or platinum group metals (PGMs) on an 
international level. The covenant’s approach is based on the 
emergence of economic incentives for the recycling of such 
fractions, together with appropriate framework conditions.
In principle, the covenant should agree upon a suficiently 
long period warranting stable long-term framework condi-
tions for the enterprises involved to ensure amortization of 
the necessary investments. The exact write-off period will 
have to take into account the speciic situation of ELV dispos-
al in the individual countries of destination, in analogy to the 
transition periods for EU-acceding countries to implement 
the ELV  Directive. 
It is important that all obligations of the contracting parties be 
precisely and veriiably deined. In the context of this covenant, 
goals should be deined on four levels: (1) completion of in-
dustrial material cycles, (2) recycling standards, (3) enhanced 
monotoring and reporting, (4) enforcement and sanctions. 
This can be outlined as follows:
4.1 Closing of indUsTrial maTerial  
CYCles inClUding ConsUmpTion
In addition to the targets ixed by the ELV Directive regard-
ing the recycling of a certain share by weight of an ELV, the 
covenant should deine standards speciic to groups of ma-
terials and intermediate targets for the completion of indus-
trial  material cycles. These should be based on the quantities 
currently used, establishing high-quality recycling and recov-
ery procedures. The life-cycle approach should apply mate-
rial low concepts such as the Total Material Requirement 
(Bringezu & Bleischwitz, 2009). The number of potentially rel-
evant materials includes copper and PGMs because each of 
these makes a decisive contribution to the proitability of ELV 
recycling. In addition, with particular reference to copper, they 
require  extensive dismantling of the vehicle, thus automati-
cally creating incentives for a sorted recovery of other mate-
rial groups. To this aim, material-speciic recovery rates could 
be deined as medium-term targets. In the long run, however, 
it is intended that self-supporting innovation processes be 
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Abo✂✣ ✒  ✁ precise and binding reporting obligations for the 
contracting parties involved should be agreed upon in the 
 covenant. This should, on the one hand, improve informa-
tion exchange between manufacturers, recyclers and pub-
lic sector authorities in order to identify possible eficiency 
potentials and promote innovation processes. On the other, 
publication of the reports is also intended to exert pressure 
on individual stakeholders in the case of failure to suficiently 
meet their obligations.
In addition to compulsory reporting, the covenant should also 
establish provisions facilitating the access to information for 
all contracting parties involved in order to ensure an improved 
adaptation of recycling to the quality requirements for the use 
of secondary raw materials. These could include for example 
subject-speciic working groups or disclosure of certain man-
ufacturing standards. In order to ensure eficient monitoring, 
the covenant must include obligations for the private compa-
nies to participate in the funding of such a system.
4.4 enforCemenT and sanCTions
Facing diverging economic interests of the different actors, 
past experience with regard to covenants has shown a lack 
of public control and insuficient provisions for discouraging 
free-rider behaviour of single stakeholders to constitute the 
critical points of the instrument (Bressers, 2003). As a mat-
ter of principle, a covenant should therefore include options to 
impose sanctions for non-compliance by means of civil action 
to enforce contract penalties.
In case of repeated failure to comply with the goals deined, 
there should be provisions to sanction the contracting par-
ties concerned by means of publicity and economic penal-
ties, if need be. In the event that manufacturers fail to meet 
their obligations, a binding procedure for the settlement 
of disputes should have been introduced. The latter could 
deine the options of a stringent direct regulation (e.g. with 
high recovery rates). A possible preliminary stage could 
consist, for example, in the option to exclude enterprises or 
industries from public research funding. Another measure 
to be considered could consist in a ban on such enterprises 
or trade associations from participating in the development 
of binding standards.
5. THoUgHTs on poTenTial impaCTs: 
ConseQUenCes of an inTernaTional 
meTal CovenanT
As far as we know, no international covenant between several 
states and industrial sectors has been concluded thus far. This 
is why concrete practical experience is still lacking. Also in 
Germany, no concrete covenants have yet been established. 
However, conclusions may be drawn both from the discussion 
on sectoral agreements in international climate policy and the 
experience with national environmental agreements, notably 
initiated, providing effective incentives to exceed predeined 
recovery rates. (Rates may deinitely be suitable for direct-
ing innovation processes towards a sustainable development. 
However, they should be prevented from developing a life of 
their own as a target, because as such they could potentially 
become an obstacle to eco-friendly product design.) In the 
context of the covenant, industrial partners would commit 
themselves to recovering a certain (to be negotiated) percent-
age of metal fractions contained in these vehicles, including 
the exported vehicles.
4.2 reCYCling sTandards
For the recycling industry in the countries of destination, 
such commitment by the automobile industry would ensure 
a  deined input for treatment facilities in the sector of base 
 metals. Such facilities should be constructed in these coun-
tries of destination for the exported vehicles, at least for the 
irst stages of recovery. Regarding the recovery of ELVs, it has 
to be taken into account that although the recycling of ma-
terials will lead to considerable resource savings, the treat-
ment procedures proper will be associated with substantial 
environmental impact potentials, for example if oil and other 
operating liquids are directly discharged into sewer systems. 
This is why the recycling industry should also be committed 
to high environmental standards in the countries of desti-
nation, including for example compliance with the require-
ments for treatment facilities according to the German ELV 
Ordinance (e.g. under § 5 para 3, a permission under build-
ing law; or the removal of operating liquids, see Berninger, 
2009, p. 495). Of course, these and many other require-
ments have to be adapted to the conditions prevailing in the 
countries concerned, 
Among other facts, it has to be taken into account that so far, 
there is no established system of experts who could carry 
out such controls. Thus, a further requirement is to devel-
op funding schemes for measures of capacity building and 
measures to establish basic institutions. If such capacities 
and institutions could be set up, they will also contribute to 
environmental governance in general and thus phase out 
dumping practices at least in the medium term (e.g. when it 
comes to the reduction of harmful substances in ELV cars). 
Indeed this is also a case where compliance, monitoring and 
transparency matter.
4.3 enHanCed moniToring and reporTing
As a prerequisite for eficient resource management in the 
ield of ELV recycling, the contracting parties should agree 
upon a system for monitoring the actual material lows in the 
ELV sector including exports within the EU. Many of the data 
required have already been recorded. However, networking 
and data exchange should be enhanced, while data protection 
is observed.
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✜✄ ✗☎✆ Netherlands. The Dutch Target Group Policy encom-
passing more than 100 sectoral agreements concluded since 
1989 has been part of a long-term (2020-oriented) national 
environmental policy plan. The results of the Target Group 
Policy have met with a predominantly positive response both 
by public authorities and industry and also by environmental 
governance research (e.g. Elzen et al., 2004). The success of 
such approaches towards a transition management lies main-
ly in an enhanced cooperation between different industrial 
sectors (e.g. Kemp, 2010). 
5.1 reCoverY of raw maTerials–a sCenario
Both the course and results of a negotiated solution are dif-
icult to predict. For this reason, we develop in this section 
a scenario that is based on the principles of sustainable 
 resource management and on the notion of material respon-
sibility, and which is intended to promote optimal and appro-
priate mining, production and use of raw materials for the 
beneit of society while safeguarding environmental objec-
tives (Minsch et al., 2000).
Within this scenario, a covenant is to be agreed upon between 
Germany and the ten most important countries of destination 
of used car exports (Kazakhstan, Guinea, Russia, Belarus, 
Serbia, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tajikistan, Angola and 
Nigeria). The covenant should comprise agreements on the 
copper and PGM fractions: while PGM recycling, mainly from 
catalytic converters, already constitutes a proitable business, 
the recycling of copper especially in smaller components 
(e.g. from wiring harnesses) requires a preceding extensive 
dismantling of the vehicle or ends up in the shredder resi-
due (Brahmst, 2006). For an estimate of the potential of this 
instrument, the entire range of EU exports (passenger cars, 
both diesel and petrol driven vehicles) is to be taken into ac-
count since, as a matter of course, it is assumed that not only 
German ELVs will be recycled in the countries of destination. 
Based on evaluation of the 2007 EU foreign trade statistics, 
calculations resulted in a total of 8,029,000 vehicles for all ten 
countries of destination. 
With regard to PGMs, the covenant is mainly aimed at a reduc-
tion of transaction costs in the cross-national recycling value 
chains. By means of improving the low of information, it is 
 intended to enhance the existing system and recover  secondary 
raw materials in a technically optimized way. Their utilization 
course is subject to international monitoring. At the end of the 
utilization phase, the catalytic converters are  disassembled, 
collected and transferred to a high-quality treatment  facility 
in Europe. Each catalytic converter contains between 1 and 
15 g of PGMs, a value that may vary considerably depending 
on the type of car (diesel or petrol, cubic capacity, age) and 
usage behaviour (dissipative losses in operation). In Eastern 
Europe, the incentive for systematic collection has been on the 
increase along with the share of ELVs equipped with a catalytic 
converter. Nevertheless, Hagelüken and Buchert (2010) have 
estimated that on a global level, only about 50% of the PGMs 
used can be recovered at present. 
In the context of the present paper, it is assumed that an 
increase in high-quality recovery to at least 75% could be 
achieved by the development of appropriate redistribution 
systems in the countries of destination. In this way, an addi-
tional quantity of about 7.5 tons of PGMs could be recovered 
in the contracting states. Assuming a 50:50 ratio of platinum 
and palladium used in a catalytic converter, this volume of 
PGMs is currently worth about EUR 19 million. These initially 
low revenues require hardly any investment since presently, 
the existing integrated smelters still have suficient capacities 
(Johnson Matthey, 2010, p.23).
For the fraction of copper, it shall be assumed in addition 
that the covenant will not only envisage measures that may 
be proitably implemented in the short term, but on an inter-
mediate and long-term basis may contribute to enhancing 
competitiveness by way of learning and innovation processes. 
A starting point for such processes may consist in the recov-
ery of copper contained in ELVs: to date, copper has not been 
recovered separately in the countries of destination consid-
ered and therefore is subject to dissipative losses during the 
shredding process. Currently, a quantity of about 22 kg copper 
is spent per new vehicle. By 2025, however, a continuous in-
crease to 40 kg is to be expected due to the increasing use of 
electronics in cars (Lucas et al., 2007). 
For this scenario, it may be assumed that in the future, the 
75% copper recovery rate currently achieved in Germany will 
be reached on an international level for 50% of vehicles. By 
2016, this share is envisaged to increase to 95% (according 
to the total rate of 95% stipulated by the ELV Directive). On 
this basis and taking into account increasing total quantities, 
quantities used and quantities recovered, the additional quan-
tity of copper recycled in 2030 from EU used car imports would 
amount to about 200,000 tons worth EUR 840 million per year 
(assuming a long-term price of EUR 4,000 per ton, with the 
current value being as much as EUR 7,000 per ton (Wilts et 
al., 2011).
5.2 developmenT of reCYCling CapaCiTies  
in emerging CoUnTries
The instrument of an international covenant provides a 
chance for promoting the decoupling of economic growth 
from resource use not only in Europe but also on a global 
level ( Bleischwitz, 2010). By means of agreements regard-
ing the targets, codes of practice and capacity building, the 
industrial sectors involved are provided incentives to inten-
sify knowledge and technology transfer to the countries of 
export destination where in many cases, appropriate facili-
ties and infrastructures for recycling are still completely 
missing. “In order to improve the technical and environ-
mental standards in less developed countries, an increase 
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tion payments may be agreed upon on an intra- sectoral basis, 
to be paid by enterprises making only small contributions to 
reaching the set targets. Similar approaches could apply on 
the inter-sectoral level for negotiations between recyclers and 
car manufacturers as well as the resource-based industries. 
This also demonstrates that for sustainable materials man-
agement it is necessary to go beyond product governance and 
to also address horizontal integration.
Taking into account the entire value chain innovative ap-
proaches should result in shifting the resource eficiency 
frontier upwards. To achieve this aim, however, it is necessary 
to agree upon allocation rules for the equalization of costs 
incurred and beneits generated. Nevertheless, it has to be 
stated that it is impossible for a single policy instrument to 
appropriately cover the entire range of problem structures, 
objectives, types of stakeholders, resources, etc.. Instead, a 
balanced mixture of policies will be required to overcome the 
variety of obstacles, take into account innovation phases and 
cope with the future global challenges of sustainable resource 
management. Hence, in the short term, an international metal 
covenant could provide a means to beneit from a tense situ-
ation on raw material markets. In a medium-term perspec-
tive, it could constitute an expandable component of global 
resource management.
Future interdisciplinary research will be needed at the in-
terface between legal institutions, economic incentives and 
 different spatial conditions in order to assess the eficiency 
of  know-how in  connection with technology transfer […] is 
urgently needed”. (UBA, 2009, p.5) 
For the recycling industry to be involved in the covenant, 
the export of technologies constitutes an enormous market 
 potential. Presumably, the market for environmental tech-
nologies for dismantling, shredding, or sorting will triple by 
the year 2020. Presently, the international market share of 
 German enterprises in this ield of business corresponds to 
about 25% (Federal Ministry for the Environment, 2009).
6. ConClUsions
The decisive advantage of a private law contract on ELV re-
cycling will lie in the opportunity to involve states and stake-
holders outside the EU and thus, outside the regulatory area 
of the ELV Directive. The covenant will apply in an area which 
otherwise is not immediately accessible to legislation, either 
due to a lacking legal basis, to serious deicits in regulatory 
knowledge or for other reasons. Covenants may also work in 
anticipation of a possible passing of regulatory provisions (for 
a legal evaluation of binding self-commitments, see for ex-
ample Töller, 2008, and Hagenah, 2002). Figure 2 depicts the 
scheme of our proposal.
We expect this sectoral approach to allow enterprises to 
 coordinate their shares in the targets negotiated that can be as-
sumed according to their individual adjustment costs. In anal-
ogy to the approach of an emissions trading scheme, equaliza-
Figure 2. Scheme of an International Metal Covenant
Source: Wilts et al. 2010
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of the instrument and its different components. In particular, 
the ongoing debate about transition management and stra-
tegic niche management could substantially enhance the 
understanding of the socio-technical dynamics and the inter-
ests involved of the ELV challenge (Geels et al., 2010), while 
our approach may enrich the international dimension of such 
strands of research.
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